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Despite the recent reiteration that the control of extractive resources ‘lies at the core of modern 
economic and social development’ (Bebbington 2014: 86), it also operates as something ‘imagined’ 
rather than just a material reality. One key mode of governance through which this dualism is 
highlighted is through the discourse and policies of a (re-)emergent ‘resource nationalism’. Indeed, 
an increasing number of contemporary examples abound where the politics of natural resources is 
articulated in a shifting language of control, national identity, of ‘reshoring’ offshored resources and 
the self-determination of pathways to development. All of these are linked, in one way or another, 
by an increasing trend that the state, as a unit of analysis, is ‘gaining primacy in the analysis of 
resource geographies’ (Bridge 2014a: 118). ‘Resource nationalism’ is one such overt manifestation of 
this state-resource relation.  
 
Resource nationalism is a term used loosely to describe the tendency for (nation) states to assert 
economic and political control over natural resources found within its sovereign territory. From this 
standpoint, much erstwhile understanding rests upon a territorial conceptualisation of the ways in 
which political power is exercised in controlling the economic distribution of rents derived from 
natural resource sectors. Yet thinking on resource nationalism has been largely centred on work 
from the fields of international relations, political science and business which has been quick to warn 
of its limitations. Much of this work is inspired by the seminal call to ‘bring the state back in’ to 
studies of political issue formation (Evans et al. 1985). However, it has largely failed to take seriously 
the changing political geography of the resources being addressed, in particular the fact that new 
frontiers of extraction are emerging in ever more extreme spaces. It is argued in this paper that a 
more useful framework for analysing resource nationalism needs to draw upon geography’s 
treatment of political economy/ecology and the politics of space. This centers resource nationalism 
around a more complex understanding of the politico-spatial ordering of extractive resources.  
 
In section 2, current understanding of ‘resource nationalism’ is evaluated, in particular noting the 
sheer variety of usages and strategies. Here, geography’s theorisation of ‘hybrid neoliberalisms’ 
(McCarthy 2005) is drawn upon as an initial entry point into a more nuanced understanding of 
resource nationalism in order to conceptualise the continuum between state and market that 
defines its policy. In particular, it shows how particular geographies of resource nationalism are 
represented as more or less ‘threatening’ to global trade and investment depending on old 
stereotypes of inefficiency and corruption in the global south.  
 
Following this, section 3 shows the how the contemporary modalities of resource nationalism(s) can 
be more critically analysed by invoking the relationship between resource politics and space (see 
Elden 2013b, Bridge 2013). This is a pressing need both in the context of the proliferating emergence 
of new frontiers of resource extraction through which claims to national resources are made and at 
a time when humanity’s role as a geomorphological ‘shaper’ is under question1. For example, it 
questions how useful traditionally rigid assumptions made about nationally bordered geographies 
are in the context of a world where resource frontiers are pushed further afield, offshore and out of 
                                                          
1 This concern with ‘shaping’ is more apparent than ever at a time where the ‘Anthropocene’ is under review 
as a new unit of geological time defined by humanity’s impact on the planet. For more on this, see Zalaziewicz 
et al. 2014. 
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sight either underground or over the horizon. In this theoretical critique of resource nationalism, the 
ways in which offshore resources ‘out there’ become ‘landed’ both metaphorically (through a 
discourse of, for example, ‘reshoring’) and substantively (through the construction of offshore oil, 
gas platforms and so forth) profoundly matter. The argument that resources are connected in a 
‘point to point’ fashion through capital which ‘spans the globe’ but does not ‘cover it’ (Ferguson 
2006: 14), tends to reduce the space in-between (including seas, oceans and coasts) to something 
abstract and ‘without dimension’ (Steinberg 2013: 163). It also eschews engagement with the space 
down below, or a third dimension which defines the significance of thinking about resource politics 
in terms of volume, rather than area (Elden 2013b, Bridge 2013).  
 
Across resource rich states, the discourse of the ‘nation’ is invoked to create geographies where the 
imaginaries of resources intersect with notions of rights, identity and citizenship. Cumulatively, these 
raise several questions of justice and suggest future avenues of enquiry surrounding the coupling of 
‘resources’ and ‘nationalism’. These are highlighted in section 4.  
 
2. Resource nationalism: a ‘problem’ for neoliberalism? 
 
Whilst the contemporary re-emergence of the state in resource geographies has been pursued in a 
critical manner at a broad level (Bridge 2014a), there has been a tendency for more specific 
attention forwarded to resource nationalism to been conducted through narrowly defined, pro-
market scholarship. These discursive and substantive engagements conceptually and variously 
reduce resource nationalism to a language of energy security and economic wellbeing and are read 
in a timeworn framework of geopolitics and international relations (e.g. Andreasson 2015; Bremmer 
and Johnston 2009; Stevens 2008). To a degree this should be no surprise as resource politics tends 
to be conducted with an ontological bias that situates resources (both physically and metaphorically) 
as a ‘geo-political act’ (Bridge 2014b). Legal frameworks dictate that resources are nationally 
bordered and primarily in terms of their political and economic expediency, often serving as de jure 
and de facto constraints to policy making. Moreover, resources are not seen as just ‘there’, rather 
they are imagined to ‘belong’ to a people circumscribed within the territorial logic of the nation 
state. For example, every time that a new resource ‘discovery’ is made, the state is not only quick to 
assert its national claims but also to do so with reference to other nation states within a particular 
geo-political ordering. Thus, if we turn to recent empirical instances of resource discoveries, it isn’t 
just that gas is discovered in Tanzania and Mozambique but rather that these countries now ‘have as 
much gas as Kuwait’ whilst ‘the whole of East Africa—Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya—is sitting on 
geothermal, which is what has transformed Iceland’ (Yumkella 2014). By placing resources in 
taxonomic, pseudo global league tables of resource wealth, such assertions simultaneously suggest 
the macro-economic possibilities of growth whilst offering the politically expedient projection of 
‘control’, power and geopolitical relevance.   
 
The importance of the theoretical case to better interrogate the ‘national’ framing of resources 
should not be understated, and is one way in which geography can foster a deeper understanding of 
the topic. Yet, it remains the case that the overwhelming foci of studies that have attended to 
resource nationalism as a discrete object of study have done so from literatures that reinforce rather 
than critique the fixity of the national imaginary. A greater regard for geography’s critical insights 
into the state of neoliberalism (particularly the attendant emergence of ‘post-neoliberalism’ and 
‘neo-extractivism’) fundamentally illustrates how resource nationalism should be not be read as the 
simple opposite of familiar neoliberal imperatives of resource governance but as something which is 
always hybrid and in flux. 
 
The definitions of resource nationalism that follow are highly divergent, often contingent on political 
interests and conceptual biases. Taking this as a point of departure, it is assumed that resource 
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nationalism, like state sovereignty more generally, is not only a social construction (Biersteker and 
Weber 1996) but it is also constructed in a number of different ways. Whatever political slant it is 
given though, it is often assumed that resource nationalism should be seen as the antithesis of 
economic liberalisation or, as Halina Ward puts it, as ‘resource privatism’ (Ward 2009). Indeed, this 
antagonism towards foreign capital (Emel et al. 2011: 71) is a repeated trope amongst free market 
apologists who see resource nationalism as ‘limiting the operations of international…companies, and 
asserting greater national control over natural resource development’ (Stevens 2008: 5). Moreover, 
this dichotomy is often seen in historical terms as cyclical and naturally vacillating between ‘the 
transfer of ownership of an asset or industry from the private sector to the public sector’ and then 
back again ‘from public to private ownership’ (Butler 2013; Chang et al. 2010). This ‘swinging’ in the 
logic of an economy’s structuring highlights an early warning to the mainstream view that ‘resource 
nationalism’ is an extreme example of state control and of ‘nationalization of the society’s wealth of 
natural resources’ (Veltmeyer 2014: 107). It hints at its discursively unstable nature, pitching it as a 
policy strategy that is always in motion and part of a ‘privatization/nationalization pendulum’ 
(Hindery 2013: 22) that is rarely one pole or the other but rather a form of resource governance that 
is hybrid.  
 
The effects of setting up resource nationalism as a binary between state versus private control 
serves to reduce the conceptual range of the phenomenon down to a language of economics alone 
and overlooks the political dimensions of identity and justice. It also negatively differentiates 
different types of resource nationalism between a global north/south divide. A binary is set up 
whereby some ‘types’ of resource nationalism in particular places are seen as worse than others. 
Thus, it is repeatedly the case that where resource nationalism is said to exist in countries from the 
global North (Canada, Australia, Norway, Scotland etc.), it is seen as part of a valid, legitimate debate 
with merit on either side (Bremmer and Johnston 2009). So it is that in Norway, for example, its 
policies that have heavily taxed petroleum operations are seen as ‘a controlled success’ (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate 2012) whilst Australia’s recent ‘resource nationalism’ is seen as a strategically 
defensive move against the potential impacts of burgeoning Chinese investment (Wilson 2011).  
 
Contrary to this rationally constructed debate, when the geographic focus is shifted to states in the 
global south, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, it becomes interesting to note how resource 
nationalism is seen in an overwhelmingly negative light. Rather than being seen as part of a 
legitimate, if contested, political debate as it is in the north, resource nationalism in the global south 
is subsumed into a discourse of ‘risk’ and as a ‘barrier’ to growth and development. Furthermore, 
most of this risk is not articulated with inwardly facing reference to a given ‘resource nationalist’ 
country’s development pathway but rather it is seen as an external risk and barrier to the 
imperatives of global investment flows. In this way, political economy scholars have asserted that 
‘the serious issues caused by resource nationalism…are threatening [major International Oil 
Companies’ (IOCs’)]…future viability as business entities (Vivoda 2009: 532). Similarly those who see 
resource nationalism as ‘state control or dominance of natural resources’ fear a country’s ‘resulting 
potential to use this power for political and economic purposes’ (Click and Weiner 2009: 784). The 
‘painfully clear’ conclusion in these studies is that such policy approaches ‘leave a deep scar in the 
relationship between the contracting resource producing country and the foreign investor’ 
(Maniruzzaman 2009: 81). Notwithstanding the fact certain policies termed ‘resource nationalist’ do 
pose real risks, they are threats largely restricted to economic efficiency and growth.  
 
These intellectual, neoliberal biases towards ‘resource nationalism as risk’ are also echoed in 
substantive ways through policy responses on a global scale. For example, the UK government, 
having identified resource nationalism as a ‘threat’, commissioned the Department of Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) to investigate the issue which has thus been conceptualised as ‘anti-
competitive action designed to restrict the international supply of resources’ (Defra 2014). 
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Furthermore, when framed as an example of an export restriction, ‘hard’ action against resource 
nationalism is often invoked in normative challenges designed to protect the tenets of free tree 
agreements. One such example in this regard is in the collaborative challenge from the EU, USA and 
Mexico to the World Trade Organisation regarding China’s export restrictions on ‘key’ raw materials 
including bauxite, magnesium and zinc (Defra 2014). 
 
Policy interventions such as these are positioned (albeit with a sense of political posturing) as a 
‘hard’ rebuttal to the supposed ‘problem’ of resource nationalism. However, like the spatially 
contingent, discursive split between the ‘legitimate’ resource nationalism of the global north and its 
‘risky’ converse in Africa and the global south described above, this too highlights another 
geographical binary between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ resource nationalisms. In this dichotomy, ‘soft’ 
resource nationalism is manifested in political strategies that comprise changes to regulation, 
corporate taxation increases and restrictions placed on the export of natural resources. Examples 
here include, for example, Western Australia’s Domestic Gas (Domgas) Policy which ensures that a 
15% proportion of produced liquefied natural gas is reserved for domestic use in order to ensure the 
state’s ‘long term energy needs’ (Domgas 2012). Similarly, Canada’s tightened regulatory climate 
which has rejected takeovers from corporate giants Petronas and BHP Billiton in the last 5 years has 
been characterised by ratings agency Fitch as a ‘soft’ form of a ‘rising global trend of resource 
nationalism’ (White and Pooley 2012). Prominent geopolitical critiques argue that such ‘soft’ 
resource nationalism should be seen as ‘characteristic of OECD countries’ who ‘generally avoid 
tearing up existing contracts and using arbitrary tactics’ (Bremmer and Johnston 2009: 152). 
 
Indeed, much of this literature establishes a discourse of ‘softness’ that implies a peculiar 
geographical imaginary which is somehow specific to countries in the global north. Implicit in this 
construction is the notion that such ‘soft’ approaches are somehow more ‘benign’ than the ‘hard’ 
strategies employed by countries in the global south. In contrast to the ‘soft’ foci on regulation and 
legislation, ‘hard’ resource nationalism is used to describe strategies of state control such as 
cancellation of existing resource contracts, economic nationalisation or ‘stringent demands for 
national shares in natural resource joint ventures’ (Ward 2009). On closer inspection however, these 
‘hard’ strategies tend to be located in countries outside the OECD, particularly in Africa, and are 
characterised in a pejorative discourse of ‘threat’ and ‘spectre’ (IRJ 2012; Andreasson 2015:1). From 
this discursive standpoint resource nationalism ‘haunts’ the potential for growth and is seen as ‘a 
pernicious doctrine, and its proponents as the political enemy’ (Pickel 2003: 107). There have been 
attempts made to nuance its variety, such as Bremmer and Johnston’s widely cited typography 
which, as well as its ‘soft’ variety, distinguishes between ‘revolutionary’, ‘economic’ and ‘legacy 
resource nationalism’ (Bremmer and Johnston 2009). Yet even here, resource nationalism in the 
global South is viewed in opposition to the imperatives of neoliberal growth and as ‘arbitrary and 
accompanied by little if any compensation or recourse’ (Bremmer and Johnston 2009: 150). 
Notwithstanding the actual differences between the consequences of differing resource nationalist 
policies for resource management, the discursive split between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ belies particular 
geographical imaginaries that help to shape global political economy. 
 
Curiously this reductive dichotomy fails to engage critically with contributions from resource 
geography over the last decade which have stressed the emergence of ‘hybrid’ or ‘post-’ neoliberal 
forms of governance. This, by now, well-formed literature highlights the ‘multiple and contradictory 
aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques and subjects’ that describe the ways in which policy 
agendas are rarely either ‘state-led’ or ‘market-led’ but rather some combination of the two (Larner 
2003). Empirical studies elaborate on this point, for example in Mexico where the policy over 
payments for ecosystem services are shaped by both ‘neoliberalism…and concerns about 
sovereignty over resources’ (McAfee and Shapiro 2010: 581). Likewise, in conceptualising the 
Chilean model for governing resource extraction, Nem Singh suggests that post-neoliberalism is 
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constitutive of ‘continuity with change’, a situation that maintains a business-as-usual marketised 
governance agenda whilst simultaneously being ‘in the midst of the move towards state-controlled 
resource governance’ (Nem Singh 2010: 1413).  
 
Indeed, it can be argued that in different geographies some combination of neoliberal and state-led 
intervention always co-constitutes and describes resource policy, albeit to varying degrees. Thus it is 
that rather than being at one end of what Ward terms the ‘host state versus investor influence 
spectrum’ (Ward 2009), there is an arguable trend towards policy ‘convergence’ (Bebbington 2014). 
Subsequently, just as Bebbington urges critical caution in the use of ‘post-neoliberalism’ as a distinct 
mode of extractive governance (Bebbington 2014), so too should similar care be forwarded to the 
analysis of ‘resource nationalism’. In other words, any engagement with the terminology, despite its 
obvious semantic leanings towards the state as a unit of analysis, often retains an ‘inextricable 
interweaving in practice of analytically separable policy trends’ (McCarthy 2005: 998).  
 
Viewing ‘resource nationalism’ as an example of the way in which the arena of environmental 
governance itself produces (and contests) neoliberal hybridizations (McCarthy and Prudham 2004) is 
instructive for nuancing the ‘rising tide’ of the phenomenon (Dargin 2008, 2015). For example, 
Ghana’s 2013 introduction of far-reaching ‘local content law’ which is aimed at attaining control for 
Ghanaians over petro-development through, inter alia, guaranteed equity allowances for Ghanaian 
firms is characterized in legal terms, as ‘resource nationalism’ (Government of Ghana 2013; Sauvant 
2013: 346). However, at the same time as this post-neoliberal logic is present in the country’s 
petroleum sector, the president of Ghana’s Chamber of Mines proffered that ‘everything should be 
done to boost [foreign] investor confidence in the [mining] industry’ (Government of Ghana 2012). 
These examples involve the selective nationalization in some sectors (e.g. hydrocarbons), while at 
the same time fostering various forms of privatization in others (e.g. minerals or water) and echo 
what Kaup and Hindery call, in the context of Bolivian pipeline and gas politics, ‘neoliberal 
nationalization’ (Kaup 2010; Hindery 2013). 
 
In recent times, scholars have noted increased instances of a shift away from development 
intervention guided by the Post-Washington Consensus towards ‘more productivist and nationally-
owned development strategies’ (Hickey 2013: 194). By describing the conditions of political 
restructuring in Latin America, Grugel and Riggirozzi note the retention of market-led growth models 
in bringing about post-neoliberal welfare changes (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012). One contemporary 
and understudied example of this trend can be found in Ecuador’s policy of ‘La Patria Nueva’ (the 
new nation) which promises to ‘leap forward from an economy of finite (material) resources-based 
economy to an economy based on infinite-based resource: knowledge’ (Buen Vivir National Plan 
2013). Continuing this more specific focus on resource extraction, important edited volumes have 
considered the politics and colonial legacies that have come to shape development models of 
resource extraction in the region (Bebbington 2014; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). 
 
Much of this literature describes this new role for the state in resource governance as heralding an 
era of ‘neo-‘ or ‘new extractivism’ whereby extractive capital mutates in response to the challenges 
presented to neoliberal modes of extraction. Riffing on the metaphor of the state as a resource 
actor, Veltmeyer and Petras view Latin America as ‘the most important theatre today in the 
worldwide offensive against neoliberalism…in regard to the formation of a new type of state that 
marks the end of capitalism as we have known it during the neoliberal era’ (Veltmeyer and Petras 
2014). However, notwithstanding the fact that a majority of critical attention on the subject of state-
led resource policy has been centered on Latin America, other regions (most notably Africa) have, 
with the exceptions that follow, been largely ignored when the analytical focus is sharpened to focus 
on the discourse of ‘resource nationalism’ itself. In this way, there have been compelling arguments 
made around the relationship between territory, conflict and the identity politics that surround 
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resource nationalism in Bolivia and Ecuador (Kohl and Farthing 2012; Perrault and Valdivia 2010). 
Shifting attention to Asia, recent work has explored the cultural politics of resource extraction in 
India, in particular noting how coal has become akin to a ‘national icon’ such that ‘coal nationalism’ 
has replaced ‘coal colonialism’ thus creating a ‘coal nation’ (Lahiri-Dutt 2014). Likewise, China’s 
investment in gold, chromium and copper mining in the mountains of Tibet has been conceptualized 
as ‘resource nationalism on the roof of the world’ (Lafitte 2013). In the African context though, 
critical analysis of resource nationalism as an example of a ‘new politics of development’ is still 
largely lacking (Hickey 2013). 
3. Resource nationalism and space: new frontiers of extraction    
Key political claims of resource nationalist countries are implicitly framed by a control of resources 
that lie within nationally bounded spaces, of contiguous land masses with physically defined political 
borders. Here the territoriality, or ‘the use of territory for political, social and economic ends’ 
(Agnew 2005: 437) of the resource nationalist legitimates ‘national’ claims to resources.  This is part 
of a particular resource ecology whose ‘natural resources [are conceptualised] as territorial 
inventories’ and whose strategies of resource mapping and appropriation ‘seek to produce the 
“body” of the nation’ (Bridge 2014b: 1-2). In conceptualising the resource nationalist state in this 
way, politicians and their commentators view it as a ‘bordered power container’ that ‘only exist in 
systematic relations with other nation states’ (Giddens 1985: 4). In doing so, such notions fall into a 
kind of ‘territorial trap’ and fail to recognise that the spatiality of state power ‘cannot be entirely 
reduced to the template of state sovereignty’ (Agnew 2005: 442). In this section, I aim to critique the 
‘boundedness’ and ‘spatial coherence’ (Painter 2006: 3) inferred by the imaginary of resource 
nationalism and, by drawing upon new literature, to provoke new ways of imagining the spatial 
configurations of resources. Indeed, this is crucial not only in a theoretical sense but also in 
substantive ways because it is precisely the very act of representing the spatial imaginaries of 
resources which renders them visible and as powerful political objects in and of themselves. 
 
There has been an ongoing turn in political geography which complicates this static, bordered view 
of state territoriality. This perspective focuses instead on what Alison Mountz terms the ‘more 
ambiguous spatial arrangements or “gray” zones through which sovereign power operates and is 
produced’ (Mountz 2013: 830). It picks up on the related point that the ‘national’ frame is no longer 
particularly useful for analysing sovereignty and that the state’s ‘ability to pursue…developmental 
policies within their own territories as they see fit’ (Wapner 1998: 276) is better seen as a ‘relational 
aggregation of global forces’ (Emel et al 2011: 72). In this way, the challenge is to unpack the ‘global 
geography of sovereignty’ (Sidaway 2003: 160, emphasis added). In the case of resource nationalism, 
the questions that this raises are significant. Should, for example, ‘national’ resources that are 
‘offshore’ be engaged with analytically in the same way as resources that are ‘onshore’? How do we 
make sense of ‘resource nationalist’ claims to resources over disconnected landmasses, for example 
Danish claims to ruby extraction in Greenland? Whose ‘national’ claim counts in contested space 
such as the Arctic? All of these inquiries, in one way or another, provoke an interrogation of the 
relationship between space on the one hand and politics on the other. Resource nationalism, at least 
at a policy level, seeks to reduce this complex relationship to something fixed, static and to locate 
extractive resources in particular places with a ‘peculiar geographic certitude’ (Eudaily and Smith 
2008: 310). This imaginary seems ever more inappropriate on a planet where, as has been 
highlighted with reference to oil extraction, geographies of investment seek out access to 
‘conventional’ resources in ‘unconventional’ places including deepwater, offshore spaces such as the 
respective Gulfs of Guinea and Mexico (Bridge and Le Billon 2013: 61)2. 
                                                          
2 Bridge and Le Billon (2013) also note that the opposite is true: that investment in resource extraction also 
proliferates around ‘unconventional’ resources in ‘conventional’ locations, such as oil sands in Canada or 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in the USA.   
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The ‘offshore’ is a fine example of the way in which sovereignty’s ambiguities are exposed. 
Numerous instances of offshore oil and gas ‘discoveries’ highlight not only the proliferating reach of 
global extractive capital on the one hand but also the way in which they can be spatially mobilised in 
a discourse of resource nationalism on the other. Put another way, the status of being ‘offshore’ is, 
from one perspective, an unbundling of sovereignty where ‘both the state system and an 
increasingly integrated market can live comfortably with each other’ (Hudson 1998: 933; Palan 
2006). Thus, it is found that at the same time that capital is promised freedom and mobility in the 
offshore, it is simultaneously regulated and conditioned by resource nationalist policies that attempt 
to project political control over domestic fiscal and economic planning. The offshore exists not as an 
essentialist space for either the fluid modalities of spatial fix or for the counter-logic of state control 
promised by resource nationalism but rather as one point in a connection with the onshore. 
Contemporarily, one example of this relation is the imposition of capital gains taxation as a means of 
resource nationalism. Here, the state aims to capture tax on the gains made by international 
resource companies on ‘non-resident’ transactions where the value is derived from assets based 
within their jurisdiction. Witnessed in Mozambique (regarding offshore oil and gas), Uganda (in 
relation to oil) and India’s new finance bill that particularly targets structures with ‘no substantial 
commercial purpose’ (Government of India 2013: 13), the ‘offshore’ has emerged as a key 
battleground for the fiscal and discursive effects of resource nationalism. Put another way, it is not 
only the case that the ‘offshore’ resources present a major disjuncture to the idea of a national 
economy in both conceptual and substantive ways. It is also, as a particular configuration of space, 
shaped and, mediated by state involvement inclusive of resource nationalist policies. The ‘offshore’ 
is still sanctioned by the state, the currencies used to trade in resources are often still ‘national’ and 
spatially it remains within the legally defined borders of the state. Thus, whilst remaining cognisant 
that the ‘offshore’ includes economies of ‘signs and space’ (Lash and Urry 1994), it is instructive to 
remember that it is still ‘embedded in the concept of national sovereignty over economic activity, 
however much they may be disengaged from the territory’ (Cameron and Palan 2003: 175).  
 
Just as the conventionality of resource extraction is being challenged, so too should the conceptual 
frontiers for reading resource nationalism be questioned. Indeed this call is beginning to provoke 
some important responses from across the social sciences. First, sociologist John Urry has shown 
how sites of extraction, capital appropriation and responsibility have been shifted out of sight, 
through both complexity and concealment, and can be seen as crucial features of a new ‘offshore’ 
society. The argument’s relevance to ‘offshore’ resources should be clear; namely, that nationalist 
claims to contemporary discoveries of gas or oil relate to resources that are ‘found’ sometimes 
hundreds of miles away from national coastlines. As Urry asserts, ‘to go offshore means to go out of 
view from land, over the horizon, beyond observation’ (Urry 2014: 157). If one considers that the 
horizon is necessarily limited by the bounds of human vision (typically around three miles away) it 
results that the majority of offshore resources are invisible to human populations in a physical sense. 
This is in contrast to conventional, landed sites of extraction (mines for example) where, even 
though the resource may be thousands of feet underground, the surface point of extraction is still 
visible to those communities who are resettled as a result. Contrary to this however, narratives of 
resource nationalism render those resources that are unseen, into something politically visible, 
perceptible and of ‘national’ concern. Indeed, it is precisely the indiscernible nature of offshore 
resources that make them politically powerful in so far as their imagined geographies can be 
constructed through the discourse of resource nationalism as full of economic promise, security and 
so forth depending on the political climate and imperatives of the time. To this end, the imagined 
geography of the ‘resource nation’ can be seen as part of the cultural turn in political economy more 
broadly where the ‘performance’ of politics through language is emphasised (Jessop 2004).    
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Resource nationalism’s analytical reach needs to be extended to better reflect upon the widening 
and deepening of extractive resource frontiers, which go beyond the ‘offshore’ yet are still subject to 
the impacts of national claim making. Indeed the global ordering of geopolitical space is being 
challenged as advances in both technology and political strategies make possible resource extraction 
in ‘new’, ‘unbordered’ and territorially non-contiguous sites. Much of this work that reflects on 
contemporary extraction taking place ‘beyond the state’ focuses on polar geographies, the Artic in 
particular. A recent special issue in The Polar Journal highlights a new wave of this endeavour with 
analyses of the regions’ identity politics and cultural nationalism to the fore (Dodds and Powell 
2013). This builds on Klaus Dodds’ interrogation of the Arctic’s increasing geopolitical importance 
where the discourse of ‘coastal states’ in countries like Iceland is mobilised in order to make 
particular claims to the region’s resources (Dodds and Ingimundarson 2012). At the opposite pole, 
Dodds and Benwell refer to the ‘interaction between commercial exploration, the spectre of 
violence, and resource-led nationalism’ in describing nationally framed claims to resources in the 
Antarctic, a legacy of a post-Falklands geopolitical seascape (Dodds and Benwell 2010: 576).  
 
The rise of the resource nationalist state is also being rendered visible in other ‘new’, more extreme 
frontiers of extraction such as the deep sea and the moon. In the case of the former, for example, 
the discursive battle lines are already drawn between apologists for an ‘emerging marketplace’ who 
claim that the deep sea floor ‘contains four kilograms of gold for every person on the planet’ and 
those who see it instead an ecosystem ‘under siege’ (Gross 2014: 139). Indeed some states don’t 
view the deep sea as a geopolitical opportunity at all, rather invoking the national imaginary to 
‘protect’ rather than ‘control’ sovereign resources. For example, Namibia’s issuing of a moratorium 
on all deep sea mining activity in 2013 follows a general admonition from the research community to 
adopt a precautionary principle against deep sea mining. In this case it is the nation itself that is 
under threat, and its resources enshrined in its constitution as ‘a mirror reflecting the national 
soul/the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation, the articulation of the values 
bonding its people and disciplining its government’3. This cultural politics of resource nationalism is 
similarly repeated in contemporary claims for the moon where US republican politician Newt 
Gingrich famously pronounced the establishment of a permanent moon base by 2020 which ‘will be 
American’. Whether or not this should be taken as a warning that given regulatory inaction the 
moon might become the site of a new resource ‘scramble’, it does at the very least highlight the 
ways that studies of resource nationalism must keep pace theoretically with the changing politico-
spatial ordering accelerated by technological change.  
 
Much of the above serves to provoke a more critical theoretical framing of resource nationalism by 
unhinging the fixity of its national imaginary and by conceptualising resource ecologies in new ways. 
These include, significantly, a concern with the verticality of resources which, in addition to the 
imaginary of areal, national territory, functions as a third dimension and creates ‘volume’ (Elden 
2013b). In the context of the ‘resource nation’, this spatial (re)imagination demands engagement 
with the new ways in which power circulates and is used to ‘secure’, control and determine 
strategies of resource development. States pronounce newly discovered resource wealth in a 
rhetoric of volumetry: ‘barrels of oil’ are produced; calculations of ‘cubic feet’ are used as the basis 
for revenue sharing negotiations and so on.  
     
The question of who owns and ‘controls’ the subsurface is also a question of law which needs to 
make sense of resource claims based on national space and its jurisdiction. Taking up Stuart Elden’s 
question of ‘where does the law apply, and where does it cease to apply’ (Elden 2013b: 35) is, in the 
context of resource governance, nowhere more relevant than in the context of contemporary 
reports of resource nationalism being ‘alive and well’. For example, Namibia’s current concern with 
                                                          
3 Ismael Mahomed, chief justice of Namibia cited in Sachs (2009: 7) 
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the extraction of ‘their’ deep seabed must engage with its status as a resource frontier which is 
managed under the concept of the Common Heritage of Humankind, a principle negotiated before 
appropriate mining technologies were developed. The instances of negotiations that take place 
between the politico-legal imperatives of the nation and relevant international frameworks more 
generally are likely to become more prevalent as technologies used in resource extraction become 
more advanced. It also suggests that, in thinking through new spatial configurations of resources, 
the possibility of thinking about time adds an extra dimension to the vertical and areal. Future 
studies of resource nationalism in particular places might, for example, critically map the genealogy 
of the ‘resource nation’, of histories of (uneven) development intervention (Perrault 2013), the 
legacies of social and environmental injustice, identity politics and symbolic borders. In the 
concluding section, I suggest some ways in which these insights from geography might enrich such 
future analyses.  
   
4. Ways forward in reframing resource nationalism  
 
Resource nationalism symbolically and materially equates increased national control of extracted 
resources with the more equitable distribution of their benefits. Yet the discursive mobilisation of 
the ‘resource nation’ and its attendant promise of distributive justice simultaneously elides both an 
engagement with both the plurality of voices across a range of scales and the different dimensions 
of justice. Resource nationalist claims might emerge rhetorically from national governments but they 
simultaneously occlude competing claims and identities of a citizenry at the sub-national scale that 
may not define itself through resources (or be defined) in terms of the ‘nation’. In this sense, these 
struggles over resource ownership and governance are always ‘territorialized within national space’ 
(Perrault 2013: 87, emphasis added). Furthermore, the act of highlighting competing historical 
experience and the identities of resource affectees is to stress the political importance of the 
inequitable ways that nature and the nation is negotiated. One useful way of framing these concerns 
is through the lens of environmental and social justice which can explain the uneven distribution of 
resource costs and benefits, expose the varying levels of influence, access and awareness to the 
policy making process and emphasise the politics of (mis)recognition at different scales (Sikor and 
Lund 2009).  
 
One example of this relates to debates over Tanzanian recent gas discoveries which reveals the fault 
lines in the homogeneity of Tanzania as a ‘resource nation’. Here, incipient social mobilization, 
competing claim-making and activism from numerous groups across various scales is already 
apparent following predictions that the country will become the world’s third largest exporter of 
natural gas by 2020. Indeed, sabotage and disruption to pipeline infrastructure is enacted on 
account of the perceived historical legacy of uneven development in the country that situates a 
marginalised citizenry in the south against the urban elite in the north (Ndwimbwa 2014). Such 
contentious politics stands in marked contrast to the intimate coupling of resource and nation which 
was famously part of the Arusha Declaration of 1967. There, in imagining a Tanzanian version of 
African socialism or ujamaa, the presidential declaration asserted that ‘all citizens together possess 
all the natural resources of the country in trust for their descendants’ (Mwakikagile 2007: 448). Yet 
the critique in contemporary Tanzania, manifested in both localised rioting and discursive 
sloganeering, frames the relationship between resources and the nation as entirely fractured rather 
than unified. In particular, the pipeline that connects the gas rich region of Mtwara in the country’s 
south with the urban centre of Dar es Salaam hundreds of miles to the north acts as both a symbolic 
and material reminder that both natural gas and the justice claims made over it are always dynamic.  
 
Furthermore, other forms of injustice are present exemplified by resource contracts being 
negotiated in ways that lack transparency or through a politics of misrecognition that represents 
protests surrounding resource extraction as variously criminal, culturally backward and unpatriotic. 
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Taken together, emphasising narratives of justice destabilises the idea of a homogeneous ‘resource 
nation’ critiqued by mainstream neoliberal thinking. The politics of justice thus represents an 
important part of what a critical reading of resource nationalism might look like. Whilst a full 
empirical examination of this relationship is outside the purpose of this paper, the following points 
are implicit throughout the discussed literature; First, while the legitimacy promised by state claims 
to ‘national’ resources offers a discursive connection to varying modes of justice (including 
distributive, procedural and as recognition), it often fails to critically unpack competing claims to 
resources made within a nation’s borders. Moreover, given that any justice claims made over natural 
resources are also inclusive of a politics of identity, the associated point is that these identities also 
change depending on their scalar focus. On one level resources aren’t just something which belong 
to a state, they are a definitional part of the very biophysical and ideological fabric of the nation 
state itself. Brazil’s recently announced plans to effectively ‘nationalize’ the Amazon by 
constitutionally enshrining the rainforest into sovereign law is one example of this. Not only does it 
exemplify an extreme version of contemporary resource nationalism, it also highlights the ways in 
which the voices of indigenous groups are marginalised, ignored and not seen as ‘Brazilian’. In other 
words, the distributive justice of resource nationalism is always mediated by the enormous variety 
of claims to identity and ownership formed around resources and the nation themselves.  
 
In summary, this paper has shown the value of bringing the international relations literature 
surrounding resource nationalism into conversation with relevant insights from geography that have 
studied the relationship between extractive resources and the state. In doing so, it complicates 
overly reductive understandings of resource nationalism and provides a more balanced and better 
explanatory account. Under this new reading, it suggests that resource nationalism should not be 
seen as anathema to the imperatives of private-led extraction but rather as something more hybrid. 
It has shown that, in a world of ever expanding resource frontiers, ‘national’ borders of extraction 
are more fluid that those currently presented by mainstream literature with a neoliberal bias. 
Finally, it argues that the ‘one nation’ discourse of resource nationalism is misguided as it fails to 
factor in matters of justice that operate at different scales. 
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